Beyond Just War and Pacifism:¹
Toward a Unitarian Universalist Theology of Prophetic Nonviolence

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When, if ever, is the use of military force morally justifiable? How should Unitarian Universalists respond to this question in light of our theological principles, our historic practices, and the world situation today? These questions lie at the heart of the UUA Congregational Study/Action Issue for 2006–2010 on Peacemaking (SAI).² The SAI puts the question this way:

Should the Unitarian Universalist Association reject the use of any and all kinds of violence and war to resolve disputes between peoples and nations and adopt a principle of seeking just peace through nonviolent means?

The SAI’s accompanying Resource Guide offers a list of possible study questions, and the first two of these reframe the central question in terms of the “just war” and “pacifist” traditions:

- Should we, the Unitarian Universalist Association and member congregations, adopt a specific and detailed “just war” policy to guide our witness, advocacy, and social justice efforts?
- Should we, the Unitarian Universalist Association and member congregations, reject violence in any form?

Beneath these questions lies the larger question whether we should adopt any formal policy at all, instead of just muddling through on an ad hoc basis as we have been doing. This is more than a practical question about whether any particular proposal could gain sufficient support to be adopted at General Assembly. Questions of theology and ecclesiology—questions about our identity as a religious tradition—are also involved.

I suspect the denomination as a whole is ambivalent about these questions, as I suspect are many of us as individuals. The Resource Guide notes that historically, Unitarian Universalists have generally followed the just war model, as have most other religious liberals, though to my knowledge we have never adopted it as a formal policy. Yet there have always been pacifists among us, as there are today, and we have long affirmed peace as a fundamental value. The Resource Guide names this tension: “Our principles are models for peacemaking yet we act as if violence is more effective than nonviolence in certain situations. As a religious denomination, we need to clarify our position.”³

I argue that we should avoid getting caught up in a debate between just war and pacifism. By recognizing that these traditions share several core commitments and that these commitments also reflect our own theological principles, we can move beyond old
divisions and adopt a position that integrates critical elements from both traditions. In this paper, I offer my own proposal for an integrated position I call *prophetic nonviolence*. I begin by sketching three basic strategies of response to war: strategies of *legitimation*, strategies of *prevention*, and strategies of *denunciation*. I then undertake a more detailed discussion of just war and pacifism, followed by an overview of some historical examples from our own tradition. Finally, I develop my own proposal in more detail in light of the commonalities between just war and pacifism and our Unitarian Universalist theological principles.

**Three Strategies**

**Strategies of Legitimation**

Strategies of legitimation seek to justify the practice of war. They are grounded in philosophical and religious worldviews that see human beings as naturally violent and war as natural and inevitable. I will sketch two such strategies, *realism* and *total war*.

**Realism.** Realism holds that decisions about war should be made solely on the basis of national self-interest and political necessity, and that moral or legal considerations are not relevant to these decisions. The classic phrase is "*inter arma silent legis*: in time of war, the law is silent." On this view, a war can be politically ill-advised or strategically unsound, but it cannot be immoral or unjust. As Michael Walzer points out, however, while this approach claims to be beyond the realm of moral argument, it sometimes takes the form of an apology or an excuse for questionable conduct: "Yes, our soldiers committed atrocities in the course of the battle, but that’s what war does to people, that’s what war is like." In this form realists recognize that moral issues are relevant, but they argue that a different set of moral rules applies. David Mapel argues that while some realists take the more extreme position, realism is best understood as the claim that "morality should not always govern state conduct."

United States foreign policy has been dominated in recent years by a form of realism known as *neoconservatism*. Neoconservatives tend to couch their policies in the language of democracy, morality, and rights. But beneath the rhetoric lies a highly aggressive and expansionist worldview. The neoconservative approach is formalized in a 30-page document called the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS), issued by President Bush in September 2002. The NSS is framed as a response to terrorism, but it is in fact a broad-based foreign policy statement that advocates world-wide military expansion, defends the practice of preventive war, and justifies a unilateralism that exempts the United States from all forms of international accountability. Sharon Welch sees these policies as attempting to legitimize a form of Empire in which "domination is masked as benevolent leadership." Like other realist perspectives, neoconservatives’ decisions about war are driven by national interest, but these interests are shaped by the NSS priorities.

**Total War.** The concept of *total war* stems from the belief that "human society is in a perpetual state of war and that victory in war requires the annihilation of enemies." In many ways, total war is the opposite of the just war approach. Where the just war model sees peace as the norm and war as the exception, the total war philosophy sees war as the norm. This means that in particular cases there is a presumption *in favor of...*
war. In the morality of total war, killing one’s enemies is a moral duty, and those who excel at it are held in high regard.

When total war is cast in religious terms, it is usually called holy war or crusade. Lisa Cahill identifies two elements that distinguish holy war. First, war is understood as an expression of divine will; it is “war in God’s name.” Second, the enemy is viewed as totally evil, and this leads to a “self-righteous abandonment of restraint” in the conduct of war. The goal of a holy war, as in all forms of total war, is not simply defense against aggression or achievement of a political aim, but rather the complete subjugation or extermination of the enemy.

The standard historical example of holy war is the medieval Crusades, but this form of total war thinking also permeated the European conquest of the Americas and the Puritan Revolution in England during the early modern period, as well as Nazism and other fascist security states of the twentieth century. Yet not all forms of total war are labeled as such. As Cahill points out:

Christians today rarely if ever directly endorse holy war, crusading, or total war. Nevertheless, religious rhetoric is not infrequently introduced into programs of national defense or expansion to give a transcendent legitimacy to political aims.

A recent example is President Bush's unfortunate use of the term “crusade” to describe the war on terrorism. War based on all-encompassing ideologies such as “war to end all wars” or “crusade for democracy” have a similar flavor. In sum, total war, like realism, is an approach that legitimizes war in the pursuit of national interest, but it goes beyond realism by linking war to ideological or divine absolutes.

Strategies of Prevention

Strategies of prevention seek to reduce or eliminate war by encouraging alternative means of conflict resolution or by changing the social and political structures that enable war. They are therefore anti-war strategies, but they focus more on preventing war in general than on protesting or making moral judgments about particular wars. Here, I will sketch two prevention strategies, peacemaking and world community.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking emphasizes practices that help prevent violent conflict. In recent years there has been a groundswell of interest in developing alternatives to the use of violence as a response to conflict at all levels, including international, local, and interpersonal. Many colleges and universities now offer programs in peace studies and nonviolent conflict resolution, and curricula are being developed for religious congregations, public schools, community organizations, and other settings. At the international level, peacemaking strategies often involve efforts to eliminate the injustice that underlies so much conflict by promoting democracy, human rights, and economic development. Other efforts may focus on such things as promoting international mediation, reducing the international arms trade, and expanding cultural exchanges. Much scholarly attention is focused on these matters, seeking to
develop appropriate social theories, political philosophies, and theologies that can guide this work.

Many commentators now argue that peacemaking should be recognized as a third anti-war theory, taking its place alongside the traditional just war and pacifist approaches. This position points to the inadequacies of an anti-war ethic that is framed simply as a debate between just war and pacifism. Duane Friesen, John Langan, and Glen Stassen argue that “An ethic of peace and war that still operates only with pacifism and just war theory is outdated.” The problem is that while pacifism and just war may offer appropriate moral criticism of decisions to go to war, neither addresses the larger problems of preventing war and making peace. It is precisely at this point, advocates say, that the “peacemaking paradigm fills out the original intention of the other two paradigms.”

This is an important point. Certainly criticizing war is not enough. Practices that focus on preventing violent conflict are critical, and we must always be engaged in this work. Yet there remains an important role for critique. Indeed, many peacemaking advocates believe that pacifism or just war theories are still necessary to help us make moral judgments about actual wars, something that peacemaking itself does not do. As Friesen, Langan, and Stassen note, “peacemaking won’t always prevent wars, so everyone needs either pacifism or just war theory to answer whether war is justified.” Peacemaking practices are thus best seen as complementing rather than replacing these traditional approaches.

World Community. A second prevention strategy is based on the concept of world community. Today there is a broad-based international movement for world community that is based on the premise that:

The sovereign nation state is rapidly becoming obsolete in the face of international environmental, economic, and social problems that can be effectively addressed only by a level of governance that is competent to solve these truly international problems.

In place of the nation state, advocates of world community envision an international democratic federation of states, what Sharon Welch calls an “international order based on global citizenship and global responsibility.” The central features of such a system would include the rule of international law; the guarantee of universal human rights; the protection of political, ethnic, and religious minorities; institutional mechanisms for nonviolent dispute resolution, including international justice institutions such as the World Court and the International Criminal Court; and the use of peacekeeping forces under international control. At the core of this model is the belief that one of the nation state’s “greatest legacies, war, can and must be abolished.”

This vision of world community is often criticized for being unrealistic or utopian, and advocates acknowledge the profound challenges and risks involved. Yet they also point out that world community is supported by religious traditions worldwide, by thousands of international secular and nongovernmental organizations, and by existing international agencies and cooperative arrangements. The remarkable success of the European Union, for example, demonstrates that these sorts of multinational arrangements can work. In short, as Joseph Fahey notes, “the foundation for a World
Community is already in place."22 For these reasons, Welch claims that “far from being utopian, this is a vision that is eminently pragmatic."23 Moreover, we have to consider the alternatives. Welch points out that the United States’ present policy of global domination through superior military power also represents a vision of a unified world order, but it is the unity of imperial coercion rather than democratic cooperation, a *pax Americana* rather than a *pax humana*. The vision of world community offers an alternative model for the use of American power, one that takes global responsibility seriously but exercises power cooperatively rather than coercively.

Like advocates of peacemaking strategies, world community proponents often argue that the just war and pacifist traditions are inadequate responses to the problem of war. Welch points out, for example, that some of those who advocated a military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks couched their arguments in just war language. Welch is not alone in noting that the just war theory can be abused. I argue below, however, that there is an alternative—and better—understanding of the just war model, one that grounds a strong critique of war. By the same token, Welch recognizes that pacifists, too, bring a powerful protest to the violence and destruction of war. Her point is not that these sorts of critiques are misguided; but that they are not enough:

We desperately need such protests and such clear denunciations of the folly and horror of war. We need the courage of those who refuse to serve in unjust situations.... Without such principled objections to war, without such resolute commitment to peace, I would question our humanity. Without other actions, however—without sustained, concerted attempts to institutionalize means of preventing war—I question our creativity and wisdom.24

Here, Welch echoes the concern of peacemaking advocates. I will return to the link between prevention and protest below.

*Strategies of Denunciation*

The just war and pacifist traditions are *strategies of denunciation*. Both provide bases for principled critique or denunciation of war, and both continue to play a vital role in the struggle to create nonviolent alternatives to war. I discuss these traditions in more detail in the next two sections. Before turning to this task, however, I want to note an important reason for my emphasis on just war and pacifism in this paper.

For religious liberals, the question of when, if ever, war is justified has been the hard question. We can easily agree that preventing war is a good thing and that we should be committed to peacemaking principles and practices; we can easily hold up the vision of world community affirmed in our Principles and Purposes. We might, therefore, be tempted to respond to the SAI questions by saying "neither." The old debate between pacifism and just war is simply irrelevant, we might say; we should just get on with the serious work of preventing war.

But this response is too facile. Deciding whether to support a particular military action of the United States government, discerning whether and on what grounds to become a conscientious objector, responding to the spiritual needs of both
conscientious objectors and members of the armed forces in our congregations—these are critical issues which have often divided us in the past and that seem likely to continue to do so in the future if we refuse the SAI invitation to address them honestly and openly. Avoiding these difficult issues would also announce that we have nothing to say to individual members who continue to struggle with them and who may seek guidance from their religious community. The SAI refuses to let us off the hook. It also challenges us to examine just war and pacifism not simply in the abstract, but rather to understand and shape them in light of our own liberal religious values. This is the spirit in which I approach my discussion of the just war and pacifist traditions.

Just War

Just War Basics

The just war tradition is a framework for making moral judgments about war. It has been around a long time, and many of its concepts have become commonplace in our moral thinking. Michael Walzer points out that it is “the ordinary language in which we argue about particular wars.” Our debates about whether we should have sent troops to Afghanistan or Iraq, about who counts as a combatant, about the rights of civilians and prisoners—these issues are all part of the just war tradition.

There is no “official” version of just war. While the idea of limited war appeared in many ancient cultures, the just war theory as we know it today emerged in the Catholic tradition during the fourth century CE in the wake of Christianity’s establishment as the official religion of the Roman Empire. Since the sixteenth century, it has also been part of Protestant thought, secular political and moral philosophy, and international law. The theory continues to be developed and debated in both religious and secular literature. In fact, during the past several years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the just war tradition, due in part to the Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the rise of international terrorism. Our SAI process is part of this trend.

In the United States since the 1960s, two very different understandings of the just war model have emerged. This division reflects more than differences in interpretation; as David Gushee explains, it is “rooted in theoretical differences and especially in different assessments of American behavior.” One is what Gushee calls the “hard just war theory.” Drew Christiansen refers to proponents of this approach as “the enablers,…a permissive just war school that would legitimate most uses of force contemplated by the United States government.” As Gushee describes it, the “hard” just war view assumes that war is inevitable, tends to trust the U.S. government’s justifications for military force and to distrust internationalist perspectives, and applies the just war criteria non-restrictively. From this perspective, the just war theory is seen “as a tool to aid policymakers and military personnel in their decisions.” Gushee emphasizes that this “hard” approach continues to reflect the traditional just war view that the government “must be held to stringent moral criteria.” In other words, it is not the same as the amoral realist model. Yet in practice, it functions as another strategy of legitimation.

The alternative understanding is what Gushee calls the “soft” approach; I will call this the restrictive just war model. Proponents of this perspective start with very different
assumptions than those who follow the "hard" approach. They tend to be skeptical of the government’s war justifications, to favor internationalist approaches, and to apply the criteria stringently. For this group, the just war theory is “a tool for citizen discernment and prophetic critique”31 and for limiting the violence of war. The restrictive just war model shares much common ground with pacifism. Both are anti-war traditions, and both seek to limit the use of violent force. Indeed, they will be on the same side in nearly all cases.32 I believe the restrictive just war model is the most consonant with our liberal theological principles and our historical practice, and it is therefore the perspective I will adopt in this discussion.

The restrictive just war model begins with a philosophical assumption that war is and should be the exception in human social relations, and that war can and should be avoided. Peace is the moral norm; war is always an aberration. Just war analysis begins, therefore, with a presumption against war. As the National Conference of Catholic Bishops put it in their important and influential 1983 pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace, a decision to go to war “requires extraordinarily strong reasons for overriding the presumption in favor of peace and against war.”33 This is decided on a case-by-case basis, and the burden of proof is always on those who advocate war. John Howard Yoder notes that the just war model thus “constitutes a denial that war can ever be generally justified.”34 And as Joseph Fahey points out, its purpose is not “to justify war,” but rather “to limit war, to control war, and even to avoid war.”35 The just war criteria must be understood from this perspective.

Just War Criteria

The most familiar part of the just war model is probably its list of criteria. The criteria are applied to determine whether the peace presumption might be overcome in specific cases, and they are intended to make this extremely difficult. There is no universally recognized list, though the main criteria are widely recognized. They are traditionally divided into two groups. The first group names the conditions that must be met before going to war (jus ad bellum, the justice of war); the second addresses appropriate conduct once war has begun (jus in bello, justice in war). Many commentators now include a third group, addressing the conditions for negotiating surrender and restoring society after a war (jus post bellum, justice after war).36 I will focus on the first group since these criteria are the most relevant to our own denominational discernment about the appropriateness of war.37

(1) Just Cause. Just cause has to do with the kinds of actions or provocations that justify a military response. The classic example is an invasion by a foreign army, but older interpretations permitted wars of retribution and wars to recover seized property, among other things. Some “hard” just war theorists continue to include retribution or “punishment for evil” among just causes.38 But in most just war discussions today, the only causes generally recognized as justifying violent force are self-defense or defense of others in response to an act of foreign aggression and intervention in the face of a massive humanitarian crisis such as genocide.

(2) Legitimate Authority. A decision to go to war can be made only by properly constituted governmental authority. In the Catholic just war tradition, sovereignty is not simply a political status; it also encompasses a moral element. The sovereign is
responsible for the common good, and only someone with this communal responsibility can authorize the use of force. 39 Legitimate authority is usually understood in terms of individual nation-states, although treaties and other international agreements may require joint decisions in certain cases. In the United States, the Constitution allocates war responsibility between the President and the Congress, so this criterion may come into play when the President sends troops or warplanes into another country without congressional approval. Fahey argues that “Executive authority alone is insufficient to validly declare war.” In modern democracies, authority ultimately rests with the people. As a result, Fahey concludes that “Even a legally declared war may become unjust if a nation’s citizens clearly speak out and vote against it.” 40

(3) **Right Intention.** Right intention is concerned with ultimate intentions rather than immediate goals. War should always seek reconciliation and the restoration of justice. As Lisa Cahill explains, the ultimate goal should be “to create the just or properly balanced human relationships that are the conditions of peace.” 41 This means that war cannot be about glory or self-aggrandizement, and it cannot aim at total devastation or unconditional surrender. Right intention also rules out war based on some kind of higher principle that must be vindicated at all costs, such as “to make the world safe for democracy” or “to rid the world of evil.” As noted above, these kinds of slogans can easily turn a limited just war into an unlimited or holy war. 42

There is also a subjective element to right intention. Because war always causes death and suffering, those who undertake it, even for a justifiable cause, should do so with humility, regret, and full recognition of the humanity of those on the other side. A war is not justified if it stems from motives like vengeance, hatred, or self-righteousness. Critics point out, however, that those preparing for war can easily deceive themselves about their own motivations. And pacifists such as Theodore Koontz rightly complain that this criterion appears to justify “actions that may be harmful to others on the basis of good intentions or good motives.” 43

(4) **Last Resort.** Last resort is implied by the presumption against war; all means of nonviolent resolution must be exhausted before the use of violent force can be morally justified. In some ways, this seems obvious. Yet in our heavily militarized society, we are so used to thinking of war that nonviolent alternatives often don’t occur to us or are dismissed out of hand as ineffective. War can easily become the first resort rather than the last resort. But this is beginning to change. The recent success of nonviolent movements for social and political change in all parts of the world, as well as the effectiveness of nonviolent conflict resolution methods and the resources of national and international peace institutions, now make the last resort criterion a much more powerful moral tool for limiting war. This is a key point of overlap between peacemaking practices, discussed above, and the just war tradition. War is not justified as long as any feasible nonviolent alternatives remain untried.

(5) **Proportionality.** The proportionality criterion requires that even if there is a just cause, a nation should start a war only if the good it will accomplish (or the evil it will prevent) will outweigh the suffering it will inevitably cause. This often requires making judgments about the lesser of evils, always an uncomfortable position for liberals. Critics note that this argument is often invoked to excuse the killing of civilians. Michael Walzer, a staunch just war proponent, acknowledges that the proportionality criterion is “a weak constraint” that too often provides “a blanket justification” for civilian deaths. 44
Pacifist John Howard Yoder goes further and argues that this whole way of thinking contributes to a “downward drift” of just war standards. Once we accept the idea of killing for a larger good, we can easily justify violating other just war criteria—or indeed the norms of international law—for that same larger good.

(6) Probability of Success. The idea here is not simply that a nation should fight only those wars it knows it can win militarily, but that it have a well-grounded expectation when it begins that it can achieve both its immediate goal—fending off the invading army, say—and the restoration of justice that is always the ultimate goal of a just war. This encourages clarification of one’s immediate goals. For example, getting bogged down in an endless war on terrorism with no clearly defined criteria for success would seem to fall short. If a war’s goals are not realistically achievable, the result is that we end up with both the suffering we create by going to war and the evil we sought unsuccessfully to prevent.

Some Observations

The just war tradition raises many difficult issues, even apart from the practical difficulty of applying the criteria in specific cases. I want to highlight a few that are especially relevant to my own proposal.

Language. The term “just war” is unfortunate; it seems to imply that war can sometimes be just. But the theory makes no such claim; precisely the opposite: a “just war” is never just. Michael Walzer explains:

just is a term of art here; it means justifiable, defensible, even morally necessary (given the alternatives)—and that is all it means. All of us who argue about the rights and wrongs of war agree that justice in the strong sense, the sense that it has in domestic society and everyday life, is lost as soon as the fighting begins. War is a zone of radical coercion, in which justice is always under a cloud.

Yet even with this explanation, the term is still potentially misleading. Walter Wink argues that speaking of a “just war” is no more appropriate than speaking of “just rape, or just child abuse.” The term justifiable is better, but still problematic. To say that a war is justifiable within the meaning of the tradition is not to say that it is a positive good in its own right, but only “that a case can be made” for it. For these reasons, Wink suggests that the just war criteria be relabeled as “violence-reduction criteria.” My own proposal to use the term prophetic nonviolence is based partly on these language problems. However, the term “just war” has become a standard part of our vocabulary, and it seems unlikely to be abandoned any time soon.

Prophetic Critique. One of the core assumptions of the just war model is that official decisions about war and peace are always subject to moral criticism. Walzer argues that just war “is a doctrine of radical responsibility” because it holds political decision makers morally accountable for decisions that affect the lives of thousands of human beings. As a result, the just war model is inherently a vehicle for prophetic critique of a nation’s military practices, and advocates of the restrictive approach see this as one of its primary functions. Yoder captures this idea when he argues that the
heart of the just war tradition lies in the fact that “informed and realistic people take responsibility for restraining public destructiveness by pointing out the worst offenses and filling the gaps in the system.” Prophetic critique of injustice has always been an important feature of Unitarian Universalism, and in the context of war the restrictive just war model is a valuable tool for this purpose.

Rationalizing War. The just war model is often criticized on the grounds that it makes war easier to justify by rationalizing it. Yoder uses the term toothless just war talk to describe those who misapply the just war tradition by using its language to justify war rather than to restrain it. This can happen if the criteria are applied mechanically, as a check list to go during war preparations. In some ways, this is the intention of the “hard” just war approach, but it remains a potential danger for the restrictive approach as well. We can easily lose track of the peace presumption and focus instead on finding reasons to override it—a hurdle to get over rather than a moral boundary we should be reluctant to cross.

A related danger is what Duane Friesen, John Langan, and Glen Stassen call “tunnel vision.” The just war model provides a basis for moral critique of inappropriate military force, but it does not propose constructive alternatives. That, of course, is not its function; the same thing can be said for pacifism. Yet as these authors point out, “If the only ethical theory we have is one that focuses on when military action is right or wrong, its tendency is to focus our discussion on military action and away from other effective actions.” This is a useful reminder of the importance of maintaining peacebuilding practices alongside just war analysis.

A deeper problem has to do not so much with the theory itself, but with the larger social context in which it is applied. A society that is preoccupied with war and violence is largely unable to hear, much less absorb, the just war tradition’s moral challenge to violence. Drew Christiansen notes that if the just war approach is to be effective, it “cannot be simply a dialogue between bishops and scholars. It must be part of a social system that helps make the norms of the system effective in changing political and social circumstances.” The Catholic bishops point to the same problem in their observation that:

In the absence of a commitment of respect for life and a culture of restraint, it will not be easy to apply the just-war tradition, not just as a set of ideas, but as a system of effective social constraints on the use of force.

This, of course, is no reason to give up on the tradition, but it does point to the critical importance of building a deeper culture of peace, especially through more effective peace education. Perhaps our own denominational study process around this issue will be one step in this direction.

Stanley Hauerwas, Linda Hogan, and Enda McDonagh point to a far more serious problem by asking whether the just war tradition might itself be part of the historical narrative that legitimizes and perpetuates the logic of war. The stories we tell about ourselves and our histories include positive accounts of war, and over time these stories become self-legitimizing. War comes to be seen as normal and rational. By the same token, because the just war tradition has long used rational analysis to make
moral judgments about war, it too becomes part of this historical narrative and so “unwittingly functions as part of the logic of war.” If this assessment is right, it would suggest that the just war model cannot help reduce the violence of war in the long run. This claim has nothing to do with how strictly the criteria are applied or whether the theory can be manipulated to justify particular political views. Instead, it is a deeper argument that the just war tradition inevitably undermines its own effectiveness simply by treating war as a rational human enterprise.

The way out of this vicious cycle, these authors suggest, is to see just war not as an independent tradition, but rather “as an exception to Christian nonviolence.” The just war model needs to be edited out of the war narrative, we might say, and written into the narrative of peace. By beginning with a commitment to nonviolence, just war can then become a tool for prophetic critique that helps maintain this commitment instead of undercutting it. This is more or less the approach I follow in my own proposal.

Just War Pacifism. The restrictive just war model has brought just war increasingly closer to pacifism. One factor in this trend is simply the reality of modern warfare. In realistic terms, several of the criteria are probably impossible to meet. War always causes suffering and death of civilians; war always tends toward escalation and alteration of its original goals; there are always more nonviolent alternatives that could be tried. Some argue that since all wars necessarily violate at least some of the criteria, no war can ever be justified. The result is that the peace presumption has been strengthened, and just war analysis is now “much more likely to condemn a particular instance of war than to justify it.” At one point, Yoder treats the just war tradition as a type of pacifism and notes: “The pacifist will agree, most of the time, with the authentic just-war thinker: whenever the criteria are honestly used, most wars will not be acceptable.” As Michael Walzer characterizes this line of reasoning while arguing against it, the result is that “pacifism emerges from the very heart of the theory that was originally meant to replace it.” Jenny Teichman uses the term just war pacifism to describe this view.

Pacifism

Definition and Language

Pacifism is a philosophical or religious stance of opposition to war. Beyond this simple description, however, pacifism is difficult to define. John Howard Yoder points out that “There is no such thing as a single position called pacifism, to which one clear definition can be given and which is held by all pacifists. Instead, there are varied kinds of opposition to war.” In one study, Yoder catalogues 29 different types of pacifism. Moreover, a variety of terms is used to describe these different pacifist positions, and these terms are not always used consistently. In addition to pacifism, the terms most commonly used today are nonresistance, abolitionism, and nonviolence.

The word pacifism did not appear until the early twentieth century, though it is often used retrospectively (and somewhat anachronistically) to describe earlier anti-war stances as well. Prior to the twentieth century, nonresistance was the term most common used by Christian pacifists to describe what we now call pacifism, though usage was not uniform. Today, nonresistance seems to be used primarily (though by
no means exclusively) in reference to Mennonite or Anabaptist pacifism, often pointing to the debate among Anabaptists concerning the relationship between nonresistance and withdrawal from the world. Abolitionism refers to a commitment to abolish war, more or less parallel to the nineteenth-century movement to abolish slavery. This was the dominant view of many nineteenth-century peace societies and early twentieth-century liberal pacifists, and it is a common feature of the world community model discussed above. Abolitionists do not necessarily oppose all war, though many do.

Nonviolence is probably the term most commonly used today as a synonym for pacifism. Theodore Koontz, for example, switches between “Christian nonviolence” and “Christian pacifism” within single paragraphs, apparently intending no distinction in meaning. Nonviolence is also used in a broader sense to refer to the rejection of violent force in domestic contexts such as police work, family life, and cultural contexts. While I support nonviolence in this sense, for purposes of this article I will use the term in its more limited anti-war meaning.

Absolute and Conditional Pacifism

It is common to distinguish between principled or absolute pacifism, on the one hand, and pragmatic or conditional pacifism, on the other. Absolute pacifists are opposed to any form of participation in war. For many, pacifism is a personal stance, and not necessarily a political stance. Pacifists might refuse to participate in war by becoming conscientious objectors, for example, but they may or may not advocate that others do the same. By the same token, pacifists do not always oppose a government’s decision to go to war in particular cases. This view is often seen in certain “particularist” Christian groups who hold themselves to a Christ-like standard of nonviolence, but do not expect the rest of the world, especially governments, to conform. One reason for this personalist approach is that for many pacifists, the root causes of war are found more in inward human conditions such as greed and fear than in outward political or social conditions. This is the basis for the admonition that we must address the violence in our hearts before we can address violence in the world. Yet for many, perhaps most, absolute pacifists, opposition to war is both a personal and a political commitment. That is, they not only refuse to participate in war, they reject war itself as an option for settling disputes among nations.

This does not mean that there are never any hard questions for absolute pacifists. Absolute pacifism is typically based on adherence to a core principle, such as the biblical command “do not kill.” At first glance, this appears to be an easy form of moral decision making, since the same rule always applies and no hard choices are required. But this appearance is deceptive. For one thing, there is the question of the range of circumstances to which the commitment applies: does it mean no war, or no violence of any kind, or no killing? Then there are problems of interpretation, such as whether the best translation of the Hebrew is “do not kill” or “do not murder.” Finally, absolutes are difficult to maintain in practice. Yoder argues that “there can always be dilemmas” and that the term absolute is misleading if it implies that “a purely satisfactory choice is always available.” At most, he says, it means that we do not foresee any exceptions to our principle.
Conditional pacifism begins as an anti-war position, but allows that military force may be justified in particular circumstances. This stance raises several issues of its own. First, we have to be clear about what the exceptions are, and whether we are open in principle to other exceptions. Then, we have to have some mechanism for identifying the kinds of real world circumstances that trigger the exceptions. Is there a principle we can apply, or do we just decide on an ad hoc basis? If there is a principle, how is it different from the just war theory? After all, the restrictive just war model is basically a form of conditional pacifism. The same dilemma can arise for absolute pacifists who oppose only personal participation in war. Koontz complains that these pacifists have not developed a workable theory for determining “when wars might be justified for the state.” If pressed, he suggests, they too “would perhaps utilize something like the just war criteria.”

Some Observations

Prophetic Critique. For purposes of our denominational study process, one of the most important criticisms of pacifism is that it precludes prophetic critique because it offers no standards for critical evaluation of particular wars. This charge is especially relevant for absolute pacifists. If war is never justified, then no analysis of government policy is ever necessary, and no critical judgments need to be made—or can be made. If your answer is always the same, then there are no real standards, or only one standard, which amounts to the same thing. If everyone already knows what you are going to say, it is hard to add much to the public conversation.

Michael Walzer applies this criticism to the position I referred to earlier as “just war pacifism.” He argues that turning just war into a pacifist theory by finding every war unjustifiable “denies the theory the critical role it has always claimed,” a role that requires critics “to pay attention to strategic and tactical choices.” He sees pacifists’ refusal to make these hard choices as a kind of cop-out, “the radicalism of people who do not expect to exercise power or use force, ever, and who are not prepared to make the judgments that this exercise and use require.” What he is really objecting to, it seems to me, is a lazy pacifism, a pacifism of avoidance.

This criticism raises an important point, but I think it overstates the case. Many pacifists, certainly among Quakers, are very concerned with making critical judgments and with the appropriate exercise of power. Yoder, a Mennonite, points with admiration to the Quaker practice of pacifist political witness. It is also misleading to suggest that there is no critical message in the pacifist stance. Even absolute pacifists often point to the horrible consequences of particular wars, although the message is meant to be a general one, against all war, and not limited to the current situation. Yet this general message can be seen as a form of prophetic witness, perhaps pointing to the idolatry of war. And pacifist voices do contribute to the public conversation by keeping nonviolent alternatives in front of us and reminding us of our own ideals. Pacifism can also be a means of advocacy or protest, as well as a form of witness. These are all important roles. But Walzer’s criticism nevertheless points to an important issue for Unitarian Universalists. Prophetic critique is an important part of our tradition, and any stance we adopt should make room for this.
A Way of Life. Some have suggested that Unitarian Universalism might become a peace church. While I agree that we should affirm a basic commitment to nonviolence, I believe peace church communities would point to a radical difference in self-understanding that makes “peace church” language highly problematic. We can see this by comparing the basic starting assumptions of the two traditions. In both its Roman Catholic and secular versions, the just war model developed largely through principles of natural law, and not through interpretation of scripture. To put it in terms we liberals are familiar with, just war is grounded in reason, not in revelation. It provides a set of governing principles and specific criteria which we apply to make reasoned decisions about specific cases. In this sense, the long-standing liberal religious commitment to the use of reason is fully in tune with the just war tradition.

For the peace churches, however, pacifism is not a philosophical position; it is a way of life. The commitment to nonviolence does not come from being rationally persuaded that peace is the best policy, and decisions about war and peace are not made through reasoned analysis or by applying a list of criteria. Instead, as Lisa Cahill puts it, pacifism is “a practical embodiment of a religious conversion experience.” It is grounded in the teachings of Jesus, and it speaks through the heart, not through the mind. Cahill argues that critics of pacifism often misunderstand this. Because just war is basically a rule-based approach, when just war theorists look at pacifism, they see a rule-based theory with only one rule. But this misses the point. The pacifism of the peace churches does not make the same kinds of ethical analyses as just war theory. It cannot be understood by trying to discern the types of violence it will or will not allow. Instead, it can be understood only by looking at “the core understanding of the Christian moral life upon which [it] is premised.”

After working in a Quakers community for five years, I have come to appreciate the depth of a pacifist conviction that comes from the heart. This experience has also led me to the reluctant conclusion that this kind of total life commitment would be very hard, if not impossible, for most Unitarian Universalists. The peace church approach is sustained through a profound commitment to shared community practices, including historically and biblically grounded forms of communal discernment and accountability. And this is more than a personal commitment; it requires a religious community that supports not simply its members’ individual searches for truth and meaning, but rather one that understands and shares a deep commitment to live every dimension of both individual and communal life in a spirit of nonviolent love. I don’t see this deep communal element within Unitarian Universalism today. My own sense is that any form of Unitarian Universalist commitment to nonviolence, including my own proposal, will look very different than it looks in the historic peace churches.

Unitarian Universalist Examples

Both pacifism and just war thinking have been part of Unitarian and Universalist religious practice since the early nineteenth century. In fact, both appeared more or less simultaneously in the figures of prominent Unitarian ministers Noah Worcester (1758–1837) and William Ellery Channing (1780–1842). Both Worcester and Channing were involved in the first sustained pacifist movement in North America outside the historic peace churches, a movement that emerged during the War of 1812. Worcester is
considered the “founding spirit” of this movement,\textsuperscript{77} and in 1814 he published one of its earliest pacifist tracts, arguing that “war is in its nature opposed to the principles and spirit of our religion.”\textsuperscript{78} The following year, at a meeting hosted by Channing, Worcester founded the Massachusetts Peace Society, one of the first of many such organizations to appear in the years before the Civil War.\textsuperscript{79}

William Ellery Channing. Channing, meanwhile, had preached a sermon in 1810 condemning Napoleon and “the military despotism of France.”\textsuperscript{80} and two years later he announced from the pulpit his opposition to the War of 1812.\textsuperscript{81} Over the next quarter century, Channing was to produce several sermons and extended discourses on war, and they are stunning. They contain poetic and graphically wrenching accounts of the horrors of war, as well as detailed analyses of the causes and remedies of war. In 1816, in the first of his extended discourses, Channing referred to the emerging peace movement in his observation that “after the slumber of ages, Christians seem to be awakening to a sense of the pacific character of their religion,” and he called war “this worst vestige of barbarism, this grossest outrage on the principles of Christianity.”\textsuperscript{82}

Yet despite these strong anti-war sentiments, Channing in the end was at best a “near-pacifist,” as Gary Dorrien calls him.\textsuperscript{83} He believed that pacifism was harmful to “the cause of peace” and “the best interests of society” because it could lead to subjugation by a foreign power and therefore to the loss of freedom and the triumph of evil.\textsuperscript{84} Instead, Channing held what can only be called a just war position. He did not refer to the theory by name or cite any traditional just war sources, but his language suggests that he was familiar with them. In fact, his views are remarkably similar to the restrictive version of modern just war theory.

Anticipating the American Catholic bishops by well over a century, Channing begins with a peace presumption: “there is always a presumption against the justice of war; always reason to fear that it is condemned by impartial conscience and God.”\textsuperscript{85} He limits the reasons for war in terms we would recognize as the just cause, last resort, and proportionality criteria:

War, as it is commonly waged, is indeed a tremendous evil; but national subjugation is a greater evil than a war of defense; and a community seems to me to possess an indisputable right to resort to such a war when all other means have failed for the security of its existence or freedom.\textsuperscript{86}

But just cause is limited to defense: “though government be authorized to make war in self-defense, it still contracts the guilt of murder if it proclaims war from policy, ambition, or revenge.”\textsuperscript{87}

Channing also speaks to proper authority and right intent, and he adopts a moral theory of government similar in some ways to the Catholic theory:

Government is instituted for the very purpose of protecting the community from all violence, no matter by what hands it may be offered; and rulers would be unfaithful to their trust were they to abandon the rights, interests, and improvements of society to unprincipled rapacity, whether of domestic or foreign foes…. The very end and office of government is to resist evil men. For this the civil magistrate bears the sword.\textsuperscript{88}
But if war is sometimes “dreadful necessity,” it should always be undertaken “with a full consciousness of rectitude and with unfeigned sorrow.” He continues:

If any action on earth ought to be performed with trembling, with deep prostration before God, with the most solemn inquisition into motives, with the most reverent consultation of conscience, it is a declaration of war.

Channing also warns against militarism as a threat to freedom and the political stability of the community:

It arms government with a dangerous patronage, multiplies dependents and instruments of oppression, and generates a power which … endangers a free constitution…. In a community in which precedence is given to the military profession freedom cannot long endure.

Channing grounds his analysis of war in the theological principles of love, justice, and freedom. These principles are rooted in a divine love that recognizes “the sacredness of human nature” and the “inalienable rights…of every human being.” Channing recognizes that justice cannot be accomplished by coercion; “justice and force have little congeniality.” Yet human freedom can lead to peace or war, and for this reason it needs to be directed by the deeper principles of justice and love:

Freedom has its perils as well as inestimable blessings. In loosening outward restraints, it demands that justice and love be enthroned within man’s soul. Without Christian principle, freedom may swell the tide of tumult and war.

In the end, in line with the liberal moral ethos of his day, Channing sees war as ultimately a moral and spiritual problem to be addressed through moral education and spiritual maturity: “peace without can come only through peace within.”

Theodore Parker. Few if any other early Unitarians or Universalists seem to have used just war concepts as extensively as Channing, but there are passages in the writings of other figures that suggest that the theory was familiar. Unitarian minister Theodore Parker (1810–1860), for example, was no pacifist; he eventually came to support violence, including killing, in the cause of abolition. Yet he was highly critical of the Mexican War, and in a lengthy sermon in 1848 he used just war language to make his point.

Parker compares the Mexican War to the Revolutionary War which, he says, “was the contest for a great Idea. If there were ever a just war it was that—a contest for national existence.” In the Mexican War, in contrast, the United States had neither a just cause nor just intentions. It behaved like a bully who “beats a little boy that cannot pay back his blows.” He points to the justness of the Mexican defense effort by turning the situation around: “Suppose the United States were invaded by a nation ten times abler for war than we are—with a cause no more just, intentions equally bad.” In this situation, he says, “the men of New England” would resist, and rightly so, even though...

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the case was hopeless. In a passage I find disturbing, he tells his congregation: “I should rather see...every man, woman, and child in the land slain, than see them tamely submit to such a wrong—and so would you.”

In terms of just war analysis, Parker is right on one count and wrong on another. Taking up arms in defense against a foreign aggression has always been recognized as a just cause. But his argument about fighting to the death would fail both the proportionality and probability of success criteria. All just war authorities insist that justice is not served by resisting in a hopeless cause, because it brings about additional suffering and killing without fending off the evil caused by the invasion.

Adin Ballou. Just two years before Parker used just war concepts to criticize the U.S. government’s Mexican War efforts, Universalist minister Adin Ballou (1803–1890) published one of the most important pacifist works of the nineteenth century. During his long career, Ballou served both Universalist and Unitarian churches, but he is perhaps best known as an abolitionist and as the founder of the separatist Hopedale community. His book *Christian Non-Resistance* is widely regarded as a major contribution to the development of pacifist theory.

Ballou was an absolute pacifist, deeply grounded in Christianity. For Ballou, the central Christian responsibility is to follow God’s law and be true to the example and teaching of Christ. His doctrine of nonresistance is rooted in Jesus’ teaching “resist not evil.” But nonresistance does not mean passive acquiescence. After extended exegesis of this verse and related passages, Ballou concludes that the teaching resist not evil actually means resist evil. What Jesus had in mind, he says, was injurious evil, and Jesus’ “obvious doctrine is: Resist not personal injury with personal injury.”

Our Christian duty is therefore to resist evil with nonviolent love, which may include the use of non-injurious force:

I claim the right to offer the utmost moral resistance, not sinful, of which God has made me capable, to every manifestation of evil among mankind. Nay, I hold it my duty to offer such moral resistance.... But I do not stop there. There is an uninjurious, benevolent physical force. There are cases in which it would not only be allowable, but in the highest degree commendable, to restrain human beings by this kind of force.

His examples of non-injurious force include restraining violent or intoxicated persons and “ill-natured children.”

Ballou’s theology of nonresistance advocates nonparticipation in government. In its ideal form, government would be based on divine law and would not enact or enforce any laws that violate “the natural equality and brotherhood of mankind.” This kind of government would deserve our support. However, because the present government supports “war, capital punishment, slavery, and all sorts of penal injury,” the Christian nonresistant cannot participate in it. Ballou rejects the normal liberal idea that dissenters should stay involved and work to change the system. He says that would be fine if the problems were simply “minor errors and defects in details.” But current governments “are radically, fundamentally anti-Christian.... Military and injurious penal power is their very life-blood.” They are a necessary evil, better than anarchy, and Christians should generally obey the law. But the proper course of action is not to participate. The remedy
for bad government is to educate the people in the ways of Christian nonresistance and to create alternative models showing what good government ought to look like. This is more or less what he tried to do at Hopedale.

Despite the historical significance of Ballou’s work, it is not clear how much help it offers for our present denominational task. Ballou seems to have intended nonresistance to describe a way of Christian living, and not a theory to be applied to actions of the government. His illustrations are all taken from ordinary domestic life, and he does not address the question of when, if ever, a state should resort to war, though he clearly thinks war would be contrary to God’s law. The closest he comes to this is a brief thought experiment written several years later, where he argues that the Revolutionary War could have been won using only nonviolent resistance. But this idea is not developed at length; in fact, he devotes only one paragraph to it. Yet Ballou’s writing on nonresistance remains of major historical importance. It is well known that Ballou had a direct influence on Tolstoy and at least an indirect influence on Gandhi. Moreover, while Ballou’s nonresistance is best understood as a specifically Christian doctrine, he also produced the first nonreligious justification of absolute pacifism by arguing that nonresistance is consistent with natural law.

The Civil War witnessed a sharp decline in liberal pacifism as congregations and leaders in both denominations, including many ministers who had been pacifists, came to support the war. While the tradition of radical Christian nonviolence continued, it remained marginalized through the end of the nineteenth century. World War I, however, brought a resurgence of Christian pacifism, and one of the leading figures in this movement was Unitarian minister John Haynes Holmes (1879–1964).

John Haynes Holmes. Holmes was influenced by Ballou, and he developed his own theology of nonresistance in his 1916 book *New Wars for Old*. Like Ballou, Holmes grounds his pacifism in Jesus’ teaching “resist not evil,” and he agrees that nonresistance does not mean passivity; evil must be resisted. What Jesus meant was “do not resist evil with its own weapons,” violence with violence, force with force. Holmes goes beyond Ballou in one important respect. He applies his principle of nonresistance to international relations as well as personal relationships, and he argues that war is never justified, even in self-defense. Claims of self-defense cannot be trusted because most of the time, as in World War I, every country claims it is fighting a defensive war. But he argues that nations should not resist with force even when they are actually attacked, and even though the result is that they are conquered. War cannot conquer the human spirit, and this is what matters. Considerations of national loyalty, patriotism, and even national borders are not the relevant criteria. Instead, we should choose loyalty to the world, to “the great circle of humanity,” above loyalty to a nation. Like other Christian liberals of his day, Holmes looked forward to the time when, through the natural progress of humanity, war “will be utterly abolished, and permanent peace established on earth.” Holmes was later to become one of the leading American proponents of Gandhi’s views.

While Holmes was an important figure in the pacifist movement, he was in the minority within religious liberalism. Most religious liberals supported the war, and the enormous “pressure for patriotic conformity” that accompanied the war effort meant that pacifists were often ostracized. Neither Unitarians nor Universalists were immune to this pressure. In 1917, at the urging of moderator and former U.S. President William
Howard Taft, the Unitarian General Conference voted overwhelmingly (236 to 9) to support the war. The following year, the American Unitarian Association imposed economic sanctions on congregations whose ministers were not “willing, earnest, and outspoken” supporters of the war. Many pacifist ministers in both denominations lost their positions or were ostracized by their colleagues. Holmes resigned his Unitarian fellowship and, along with pacifist Universalist leader Clarence Russell Skinner, started the community church movement.

Following World War I, pacifist principles continued to be developed within religious liberalism, and liberal pacifists began incorporating the just war theory into their critiques. Historian Charles Chatfield notes that by the outbreak of World War II, “pacifism had become a respectable, although definitely a minority, position in Christian ethics.” Most religious liberals supported America’s involvement in World War II, and the AUA, for its part, urged the churches “to make the utmost possible contribution” to the war effort. The denominational response to pacifists and conscientious objectors, however, was much less divisive than it had been during World War I. Under the leadership of Frederick May Eliot, the AUA board passed a resolution declaring conscientious objectors to be “within the purview of Unitarian principles.” The ranks of Unitarian conscientious objectors at this time included Dana McLean Greeley (1908–1986), who was to become the last president of the AUA (1958–61) and the first president of the Unitarian Universalist Association after the merger (1961–69).

James Luther Adams. Our denomination’s most important twentieth-century theologian, James Luther Adams (1901–1994) was among those who supported America’s involvement in World War II. Indeed, he regularly spoke out against pacifism before and during the war. Adams opposed the Vietnam War, however, at least partly on the basis of just war concepts. “The most important,” he said, “was the criterion of proportionality—a nation should not undertake a war, if military success was obviously impossible, and if the damage inflicted was disproportionate to the good sought.” Yet the only extended writing he seems to have done on just war is a lengthy essay written in 1970 on civil disobedience. Adams thought that civil disobedience should be undertaken only after careful reflection, and he applied the just war criteria as a test for determining when civil disobedience was appropriate.

The Vietnam War proved divisive for Unitarian Universalists. The General Assembly passed several resolutions opposing the war, and former UUA President Robert West notes that “anti-Vietnam War sentiment within our denomination intensified and broadened” during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet this widespread anti-war activism in some ways reenacted in reverse the experience of World War I. This time it was non-pacifists who felt ostracized, and many people left our churches in the face of what they saw as anti-war absolutism.

It is precisely this sort of divisiveness we must avoid as we move forward with the SAI process. Among other things, we must explore ways in which the just war and pacifist traditions can be seen as mutually supportive rather than as mutually exclusive. In the next part, I take up this task.
Beyond Just War and Pacifism

In this part, I develop my proposal that we move beyond just war and pacifism by adopting an integrated model I call prophetic nonviolence. To move “beyond just war and pacifism” is not to abandon either tradition; it is rather to recognize that both perform important roles in our ongoing efforts to reduce the violence of war. My starting assumption is that the pacifist and just war approaches complement and reinforce each other as strategies of denunciation and critique. As James Childress has observed:

Just-war theorists need pacifists to remind them of their common starting point: the moral presumption against force and war. And pacifists need just-war theorists to provide a public framework for debates about particular wars and for the restraint of the practice of war.128

I begin, then, with a fundamental commitment to nonviolence. Unitarian Universalism has never been a peace church, but we have always affirmed peace as among our most basic values and for two centuries pacifists have found a home in our congregations. We have always been involved in work to create the kinds of just communities out of which peace emerges, and we have long supported the use of nonviolent methods of conflict resolution at all levels, including conflict among nations. This is the legacy we share with the traditions of nonviolence and pacifism. At the same time, Unitarian Universalism has always been an engaged religion, one that is involved in the world and that tries to make a difference in the world. An important dimension of this involvement is our tradition of speaking prophetically—of bringing reasoned judgment and critique to bear on the social conditions that generate injustice and violence. In the context of war and the use of military force, this part of our tradition has been well served by the restrictive just war model.

My proposal for prophetic nonviolence draws on both dimensions of our tradition by linking our deep commitment to nonviolence with our historical practice of prophetic social critique. It is also supported by the deeper commonalities between the pacifist and just war traditions. Before examining these commonalities in detail, however, I want to comment on my rejection of the traditional terms. I noted earlier the problematic nature of the term “just war,” and I agree with Walter Wink that this term is oxymoronic in its implications. Moreover, I want to emphasize the tradition’s role as a strategy of denunciation and critique, and the term prophetic does this.

I prefer nonviolence in part because it is broader in scope than “pacifism.” It suggests a consistent response to issues of violence in domestic and cultural contexts, issues I have not addressed in this paper but which are part of the SAI inquiry. In addition, using nonviolence helps avoid the implication that we are aligning ourselves with the peace churches, which, as I noted earlier, seems inappropriate. Walter Wink prefers the term nonviolence because for him, “‘pacifism’ sounds too much like ‘passivity.’” 129 I do not share this association, perhaps because of my own experiences with Quaker pacifists, who are anything but passive. Ironically, Sharon Welch rejects “nonviolence” because it “connotes passivity.” 130 Welch’s complaint that “nonviolence” is a negative term that retains violence as its normative point of reference is more telling, and her suggestion that we use the term “cooperative power” instead is certainly apt for
the prevention strategies she is addressing. Indeed, I agree completely with her analysis of cooperative power and her critique of imperial power. However, I continue to prefer nonviolence for my own proposal.

Points of Convergence

There are several important commonalities or “points of convergence” between just war and pacifism that support my integrated approach to prophetic nonviolence. Richard Miller, building on a point made by James Childress, argues that the presumption against war shared by both traditions “can be expressed as the duty of nonmaleficence,” or the duty not to harm. This duty encompasses a sense of compassion for those who are victims of harm, a bias against suffering, an intolerance of cruelty, convictions shared by both traditions. We can recognize these duties as among our own deepest religious values, expressed in our affirmations of the inherent worth and dignity of all persons and of justice, equity, and compassion in human relations.

A second point of convergence is that both just war and pacifism put peace in the center of their ethical thinking, and relegate war to the margins. For the just war approach, this has been both a clear priority and a potential problem. Theodore Koontz argues that the just war model tends to lose sight of its own central peace norm by focusing its analytical energy on the marginal cases. Miller points to the same problem and argues that just war advocates, along with their pacifist cohorts, “should work more assiduously to make the requirements of peace central to moral discourse and practice.” Keeping peace in the center helps focus our critique. It can also remind us of the importance of extending our prophetic practice to include peacemaking and other prevention strategies. In other words, a critique of war is incomplete if it stops with denunciation. In my model of prophetic nonviolence, practices of denunciation imply a duty to contribute to effective peace practices.

Third, both just war and pacifism are concerned with the limits of loyalty to the state. This is more obvious in pacifism, especially religious forms of pacifism, which often explicitly frame their responses to the government’s war efforts in terms of a higher loyalty to God. But Miller notes that this concern is present in the just war model as well. By placing the burden of proof on those who would justify the use of force, the presumption against war reflects a basic suspicion of official claims. The result is that the just war model is “structured to resist the kinds of claims that states may make in the name of necessity.” Joseph Fahey makes the important point that “Today’s nation states presume that young men and women are willing to kill other young men and women for their flag.” This presumption is reflected in our national policies toward conscientious objection, among other things. Killing is considered the norm, and an individual must make a case for not killing. By incorporating the counter-assumption in both the pacifist and just war traditions, prophetic nonviolence takes a principled stand against the official presumption that young people must be prepared to kill at the behest of the state.

Finally, I want to note a historical convergence suggested by the recent trend toward nonviolence in the non-peace churches. In a significant departure from tradition, Roman Catholic teaching now recognizes just war and nonviolence as “distinct but
interdependent methods of evaluating warfare.”

Traditionally, Catholic pacifists were held to be outside official church teaching. In 1965, however, the Second Vatican Council expressly accepted pacifism as a legitimate stance for individual Catholics, reversing centuries of official doctrine. The American bishops extended this in 1993 by affirming nonviolence not simply as an option for individuals, but also as a valid political option for states. Joseph Fahey notes that a similar process is happening in the liberal/mainstream Christian churches:

While mainstream Christian bodies have long promulgated the just war model as their official teaching, the return in the late twentieth century to pacifism as a legitimate Christian witness is perhaps the most notable feature of contemporary Christian teaching on war and peace.

Unitarian Universalists may be moving in a similar direction, though we will have to await the outcome of the SAI process to know for sure.

**Bases for Critique**

**Just War Criteria.** In our prophetic critique of the government’s justifications for war, we will of course draw on the just war criteria. These have a built-in familiarity and a rich set of interpretive traditions that make them extremely useful for this purpose, and public discourse about particular wars is likely to be carried on in just war language. Walter Wink argues even as a pacifist that the “just war criteria are indispensable in attempting to prevent or mitigate the hellishness of war.” I noted earlier Wink’s suggestion that they be called “violence reduction criteria” because that is their real goal. I want to extend this idea by arguing that we should turn the just war criteria around, and think of them not as a set of criteria for making the case for war, but rather as a list of reasons why war is not appropriate. The criterion of last resort, for example, tells us that war is unnecessary because there are always nonviolent alternatives. The criterion of proportionality tells us that war is wrong because it always causes more evil than it prevents. More than half of all war deaths during the twentieth century have been civilians—more than 50 million people, and this is beyond the incalculable physical and psychological suffering and property and cultural damage, both short and long term, that war always brings. In this light, using the criteria of right intention and probability of success to excuse this so-called “collateral damage” in the name of a larger good seems morally perverse. Approaching the just war criteria in this way can help us keep peace in the center of our ethical concerns.

**Theological Principles.** However, as helpful as the just war criteria may be for providing a basis for a critique of violence, we must remember that our real criteria—the true basis for our prophetic critique—are our own theological principles. In other words, our critique must be our critique, grounded in our Unitarian Universalist religious values and historical practices. I cannot develop these theological principles at length here, but I want to briefly identify several that are relevant to this task.

**Unity.** Unitarian Universalists affirm the basic unity of all existence. Beneath our individuality and our enormous diversity lies a profound relationality—an interdependent
web—that connects us. This fundamental unity is what makes possible the idea of world community, a world in which there is no Other to war against.

**Love.** Love is one of the deepest theological principles in our tradition. By affirming the value of love, we commit ourselves to creating relationships of compassion, respect, mutuality, and forgiveness. We commit ourselves to loving our neighbor, and to seeing everyone as our neighbor.

**Worth of Persons.** We affirm that all persons have inherent worth and dignity. Each of us, by virtue of our very humanness, is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect, and to have a meaningful and fulfilling life.

**Freedom.** Freedom is grounded in the inherent worth and dignity of every person. Because human beings are free moral agents, any form of coercion or violence is an assault on our very humanity. War is the product of human choices, and human beings have the moral capacity to make different choices.

**Justice.** Justice is manifested in the right ordering of human relationships. We have a religious obligation to create just communities and social structures, and an obligation to speak out against unjust practices and structures. War represents the breakdown of rightly ordered social relations.

**Power.** Power is always created and expressed in complex networks of human relationships. It can be exercised for good or evil; it can create or destroy, liberate or oppress. War is an expression of coercive and violent uses of power; peace and justice require cooperative forms of power. Power’s ambiguous nature means that its use must be guided by our core values such as love and justice.

These are among the theological principles that should guide our prophetic critique of war. This means that in addition to applying the just war criteria, we must ask questions such as these: Does this military action promote or inhibit unity among all peoples? Does it express love and compassion toward our neighbors, or does it reflect fear and hate? Does it increase or restrict the possibilities for human freedom and fulfillment? Does it contribute to the creation of right relationships and just social structures, or does it harm these relationships? What kinds of power are being used, and by whom? These kinds of assessments will add power and depth to our prophetic practice. I believe these same theological principles should also guide our overall response to the SAI question named at the start of this paper.

**Concluding Observations**

I will close with a few brief observations. First, we need to be as clear and as theologically grounded as possible. Walter Wink puts this in blunt terms: “What the church needs most desperately is precisely…a clear cut, unambiguous position.”143 This is a good theological practice. Clarity will best serve individual members and congregations in their own discernment processes, and it will provide the most effective basis for prophetic critique. Any stance we may adopt as a denomination will be ineffective if it is simply a reaction to the current political situation. Instead, it must be a genuine expression of our Unitarian Universalist theological principles and religious values.

Second, we must honor the differences that exist among us. We will often disagree about our basic commitments around war and in our judgments about specific
cases. This is not a reason to avoid the issue or to take so noncommittal a stance that we don’t really say anything. But we need to be careful to welcome and honor those who hold dissenting views. We do well to remember that one of religious liberalism’s core commitments is a principled open-mindedness that makes us suspicious of all claims of finality. We need not avoid taking strong stands, but we must always remain open to the possibility that we are wrong, or that circumstances we cannot now foresee may call for a different position at some point in the future.

Finally, we must avoid the dangers of political correctness. We do not have a very good record on this count. The ostracism suffered by those who held minority positions during World War I and the Vietnam War reflects an unfortunate streak of illiberal self-righteousness that runs deep, as any Republican in our midst can testify. I recognize the potential for this in my own position. By drawing on the commonalities between the just war and pacifist traditions and by emphasizing our Unitarian Universalist theological principles, I have tried to show that it is possible to formulate a position that can be endorsed by pacifists and just war advocates alike. My own proposal is surely not the only possibility for this. Yet a question that haunts me is whether our members who serve in the military would feel less welcome if my proposal were adopted as a denominational stance.

Whatever our individual views, we need to treat each other with compassion, respect, and love as we move through the SAI process. However inclusive our intentions and our language, we cannot eliminate all disagreement, nor should we try to do so. The very process of discussion through disagreement can help clarify our ideas and make us aware of the unintended consequences of our own words. At the same time, we need to remember that we belong to a shared religious tradition, and that our disagreements reflect our deeper levels of agreement—our shared theological principles and our shared commitment to peace.

The SAI process presents an opportunity to clarify our thinking, to air some long-hidden differences, and to make a strong public statement in support of our deepest values on one of the most important issues of our time. May we accept the challenge in a spirit of love and grace.
Notes

1 This phrase is borrowed from Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 209. Similar phrases have been used by others; see, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, Linda Hogan, and Enda McDonagh, “The Case for Abolition of War in the Twenty-First Century,” *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* vol. 25, no. 2 (2005): 17–35, 23 (“beyond the just war versus pacifism debate”).


5 Ibid., 4.


11 Cahill, *Love Your Enemies*, 123.


17 Ibid., 13.

18 Ibid., 8.


20 Welch, *After Empire*, 170.


22 Ibid., 179.


24 Ibid., 161.


26 There are many useful discussions of the origins and development of the just war tradition. See, e.g., Cahill, *Love Your Enemies*, 55–95; Fahey, *War and the Christian Conscience*, 86–102.


29 Drew Christiansen, “Hawks, Doves, and Pope John Paul II” (Washington, D.C.: Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown University, August 12, 2002); http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/publications/article19.htm. Christiansen is speaking here of the current debate within Catholicism, but his observation applies to non-Catholic uses of just war as well.
30 Gushee, “Just War Divide,” 27.
31 Ibid., 26.
33 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response: A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1983), ¶ 83 (emphasis original). Because there are many different published versions of this document, I will give references to internal paragraph numbers rather than to page numbers. In 1983 the UUA Board of Trustees adopted a resolution commending the bishops for their work in this document; see http://www.uua.org/socialjustice/socialjustice/statements/19948.shtml.
34 Yoder, Nevertheless, 25 (emphasis original).
35 Fahey, War and the Christian Conscience, 110.
36 See Fahey, War and the Christian Conscience, 72; Walzer, Arguing About War, 162–68.
37 See Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 147–61 for a thorough listing of all just war criteria and their historical variations.
38 See Gushee, “Just War Divide,” 27.
40 Fahey, War and the Christian Conscience, 112.
41 Cahill, Love Your Enemies, 5.
42 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 111–19.
44 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 153.
45 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 59.
46 Walzer, Arguing about War, x.
47 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 223.
48 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 17.
49 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 224.
50 Walzer, Arguing About War, 14.
51 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 97.
52 Yoder, Nevertheless, 151-152.
57 Ibid., 23.
59 Yoder, Nevertheless, 154.
60 Walzer, Arguing About War, 13. It should be noted that this is not Walzer’s position.
62 Yoder, *Nevertheless*, 12. See also Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War*, 1: “Pacifism is not a single unitary theory about war and peace but rather a collection of related theories.”


68 For a recent pacifist defense of abolition, see Hauerwas et al., “The Case for Abolition.”


75 Ibid., 13.


84 Channing, “First Discourse,” 31, 32.


86 Channing, “First Discourse,” 32.


88 Channing, “First Discourse,” 32, 33 (emphasis original). Channing’s language is also reminiscent of Calvin: “princes must be armed not only to restrain the misdeeds of private individuals by judicial punishment, but also to defend by war the dominions entrusted to their safekeeping.” John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* [1559], book IV, chap. xx, ¶ 11.


95 Channing, “Lecture on War,” 94.
96 Ibid., 95.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 41.
101 Ibid., 42.
102 See *Challenge of Peace*, ¶ 98.
104 Ibid., 4 (emphasis original).
105 Ibid., 146.
106 Ibid., 147.
107 Ibid., 149 (emphasis original).
110 Ibid., 692–93.
113 Ibid., 121.
114 Ibid., 292.
115 Ibid., 293.
118 Chatfield, *Pacifism in America*, 129.
120 Ibid., 139.
123 Ibid., 355–56.
130 The term is Miller’s; see *Interpretations of Conflict*, 7.
132 Ibid., 9.
133 Ibid., 122.
134 Ibid., 123.
135 Ibid., 123.
137 Challenge of Peace, ¶ 120.
140 Fahey, War and the Christian Conscience, 62.
141 Wink, Engaging the Powers, 223.
142 Ibid., 221.
143 Ibid., 229.